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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Throughout the Internet age, media industries and online file sharers have engaged 
in a cutthroat legal and technological arms race over the delivery, monetization, and 
infringement of digital music, movies, games, and books. This “war” has hurt almost 
everyone involved. The mainstream entertainment industry’s reputation has been 
marred by the Recording Industry Association of America’s (RIAA) campaign to stop 
online infringement;1 accused infringers have been sued by rights holders for tens and 
even hundreds of thousands of dollars;2 innocent customers have suffered from 
restrictive antipiracy Digital Rights Management measures;3 and consumers and 
producers alike have lost alternative ways to view and distribute content.4
 In recent years, the legal battles between copyright owners and accused infringers 
have only escalated, and the tactics used have evolved commensurately. In the newest 
breed of copyright infringement suits, the plaintiffs are independent film producers 
and adult film studios, rather than monolithic industry organizations such as the 
RIAA or the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA).5 The defendants in 
these actions are average people whose Internet protocol (IP) addresses6 were found to 
have been connected to file-sharing networks—an identification method of 
questionable accuracy for finding the actual infringers.7 In these new suits, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys no longer follow the one-plaintiff-one-defendant litigation strategy used by 
industry groups in the mid-2000s. Instead, plaintiffs’ attorneys now engage in 
so-called “swarm infringement” litigation to sue dozens, hundreds, or thousands of 
anonymous alleged infringers in a single suit. These attorneys focus on extracting 
1. See, e.g., Richard Koman, ‘Insane’ $1.9 Million Verdict Could Prove RIAA’s Downfall, ZDNet (June 19, 
2009, 14:15 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/government/insane-1-9-million-verdict-could-prove-
riaas-downfall/4994; David Kravets, File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads, After 5 Years of RIAA Litigation, 
Wired (Sept. 4, 2008, 2:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/proving-file-sh/.
2. E.g., Elec. Frontier Found., RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later 5–6 (2008), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf.
3. Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems regulate, lock, or otherwise limit how a particular digital file 
or piece of content may be used, viewed, or reproduced. For instance, anyone who has tried to unsuccessfully 
transfer a music library from an iPod to another computer has run afoul of DRM software. See, e.g., DRM, 
Elec. Frontier Found., https://www.eff.org/issues/drm (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
4. James Grimmelmann, Why Johnny Can’t Stream: How Video Copyright Went Insane, Ars Technica 
(Aug. 30, 2012, 9:00 AM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/why-johnny-cant-
stream-how-video-copyright-went-insane/.
5. See, e.g., Sunlust Pictures, LLC v. Does 1–75, No. 12 C 1546, 2012 WL 3717768 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 
2012); Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. 
Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
6. An Internet protocol (IP) address is a number that serves as a way of designating a computer’s “location” 
on the Internet. Michael D. Scott, Internet and Technology Law Desk Reference 450–51 (4th 
ed. 2003) (quoting Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1999)).
7. See, e.g., Media Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–26, No. 12 Civ. 3719(HB), 2012 WL 3866492, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 4, 2012) (“Particularly troubling for courts is the high probability of misidentified Doe defendants 
[who may be the bill-payer for the IP address but not the actual infringer] settling a case for fear of the 
disclosure of the allegations against them or the high cost of litigation.”).
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settlements, rather than bringing each case to trial on the merits.8 Swarm infringement 
suits have proven to be remarkably profitable; one lawyer boasts of having earned a 
“few million dollars” by suing 20,000 defendants in 350 such cases.9 The success of 
this litigation strategy has led to a “nationwide blizzard of civil actions.”10
 Swarm infringement cases utilize Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
to sue multiple defendants in one action. This rule allows persons to be joined in one 
action as defendants if:
(A)  any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in 
the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B)  any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise 
in the action.11
It is undisputed that much infringement occurs through the BitTorrent file transfer 
protocol,12 and that the collective nature of this protocol ties multiple defendants to 
the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.”13 
However, not every district court agrees that these cases should be allowed to proceed 
under Rule 20 joinder.14 As a result, there have been attempts to sue alleged infringers 
as defendant classes under Rule 23, which allows “representative parties” to be sued 
on behalf of all members of a class when:
(1)  the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2)  there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3)  the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of 
the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4)  the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests  of the class.15
8. See id. at *2.
9. Kashmir Hill, How Porn Copyright Lawyer John Steele Has Made a ‘Few Million Dollars’ Pursuing 
(Sometimes Innocent) ‘Porn Pirates’, Forbes (Oct. 15, 2012, 2:09 PM), http://onforb.es/RZQmtA.
10. In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
11. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)–(B).
12. The BitTorrent file transfer protocol is a fast, relatively efficient method for copying and distributing 
files. It involves breaking a larger file down into small pieces then allowing a “swarm,” or a group of 
users, to upload and download these pieces concurrently. Part II, infra, will discuss the BitTorrent 
protocol in detail.
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A).
14. Compare Media Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–26, No. 12 Civ. 3719(HB), 2012 WL 3866492, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 4, 2012), and Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), with W. 
Coast Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–5829, 275 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2011), and Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Does 
1–171, 810 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2011).
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
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Nearly four thousand named defendants in two defendant classes have been sued 
using this rule.16
 This note contends that the Rule 23 defendant class action is poorly suited for 
swarm copyright infringement litigation. First, any such defendant class is uncertifiable 
under Rule 23. Second, class certification in such cases raises significant issues of 
fairness and judicial efficiency. To this end, this note aims to serve as a reference and 
a resource for courts and defendants in such cases, to help nip this improper use of 
defendant class actions in the bud.
 Part II of this note explains how the BitTorrent peer-to-peer file-transfer system 
creates “swarms” of defendants. Part III describes the evolution of swarm infringement 
litigation and describes plaintiffs’ litigation strategy. Part IV discusses how the nature 
of swarm litigation suits precludes certification of a defendant class under Rule 23. Part 
V argues that swarm litigation tactics and practices raise serious policy and fairness 
concerns, which counsel against permitting the use of Rule 23 in this context. Part VI 
concludes that courts should not certify defendant classes in swarm infringement suits.
ii. thE bittOrrEnt prOtOCOL
 After the demise of Napster and its progeny,17 the BitTorrent protocol became 
one of the most popular methods for sharing content over the Internet.18 The 
BitTorrent protocol is designed to quickly distribute large files to other users while 
reducing the server and network impact on the party distributing those files.19
16. Complaint, VPR Internationale v. Does 1–1017, No. 2:11-cv-02068 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2011), ECF No. 
1 [hereinafter Complaint, VPR Internationale]; Complaint, OpenMind Solutions, Inc. v. Does 1–2925, 
No. 3:11-cv-00092 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2011), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter Complaint, OpenMind Solutions]. 
These defendants have been “named” in a lawsuit as anonymous “John Doe” placeholders, and remain 
unidentified until their identities are determined during discovery. For a description of a “defendant 
class,” see infra Part IV.B. These cases were voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure before either court could hear and decide any disputes relating to class 
certification under Rule 23. See Order of Voluntary Dismissal, OpenMind Solutions, No. 3:11-cv-00092 
(S.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2012), ECF No. 45; Order of Voluntary Dismissal, VPR Internationale, No. 2:11-cv-
02068 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 29.
17. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In re Aimster 
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 
(9th Cir. 2002).
18. Sandvine, The Global Internet Phenomena Report: 1H 2013, at 6 (2013), available at https://
www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-phenomena/2013/sandvine-global-internet-
phenomena-report-1h-2013.pdf (finding that BitTorrent traffic constitutes 9.2% of overall Internet 
traffic in North America). In fact, BitTorrent comes in fourth overall after “traditional” HTTP file 
transferors YouTube and Netf lix. Id. While the percentage of overall Internet traffic that BitTorrent 
consumes actually dropped in 2013, the amount of BitTorrent traffic increased 40% in the last six 
months of 2012; the fact that BitTorrent traffic constitutes a smaller percentage of total traffic is due to 
dramatic growth in bandwidth-intensive streaming video services. Sandvine, The Global Internet 
Phenomena Report: 2H 2012, at 7 (2012), available at http://www.electronics.dit.ie/staff/dclarke/
Other%20Files/Sandvine_Global_Internet_Phenomena_Report_2H_2012.pdf. 
19. See Rebecca Giblin, A Bit Liable? A Guide to Navigating the U.S. Secondary Liability Patchwork, 25 Santa 
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 7, 9 (2008–2009); Introduction, BitTorrent, http://web.
archive.org/web/20040919033827/bittorrent.com/introduction.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
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 The BitTorrent protocol has seen widespread use for both legal and illegal 
distribution of files, including software programs, patches, research data, videos, 
music, and e-books. Many companies, including Twitter and Facebook, use the 
BitTorrent protocol to distribute software updates to their customers; individuals and 
publishers also use it to share or sell authorized copies of files.20 But BitTorrent is 
also used to copy and distribute files illegally on an enormous scale.21 Content owners 
have been unable to stop this widespread infringement. The BitTorrent protocol’s 
architecture and open-source nature have insulated service providers from legal 
action. As a result, copyright owners have turned to filing suits against infringing 
end users rather than the providers of a particular BitTorrent application or the 
operators of a particular website.22
 A. Understanding the BitTorrent Protocol
 BitTorrent shares files between its users by “break[ing] a large file into pieces while 
tagging each piece with a common identifier.”23 Unlike sequentially downloading a file 
from a single source, BitTorrent allows “users [to] join forces to simultaneously 
20. See, e.g., Vince Veneziani, BitTorrent DNA: Torrenting No Longer a Dirty Word, TechCrunch (Oct. 9, 
2007), http://techcrunch.com/2007/10/09/bittorrent-dna-torrenting-no-longer-a-dirty-word/; Larry 
Gadea, Murder: Fast Datacenter Code Deploys Using BitTorrent, Twitter Engineering Blog (July 15, 
2010, 18:35 UTC), https://blog.twitter.com/2010/murder-fast-datacenter-code-deploys-using-
bittorrent; Ryan Paul, Exclusive: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at Facebook Release Engineering, Ars 
Technica (Apr. 5, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/04/exclusive-a-behind-
the-scenes-look-at-facebook-release-engineering/.
21. For example, unauthorized copies of popular television shows are downloaded millions of times each 
year. See, e.g., Eric Limer, Last Night’s Game of Thrones Premier Was the Hottest Torrent Ever, Gizmodo 
(Apr. 1, 2013, 10:56 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5993214/last-nights-game-of-thrones-premier-was-the-
hottest-torrent-ever (indicating that the day after the Season 3 premier of popular HBO show Game of 
Thrones it had already been downloaded over one million times); Ernesto, Game of Thrones Crowned 
Most Pirated TV-Show of the Season, TorrentFreak (June 8, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/game-of-
thrones-most-pirated-tv-show-of-the-season-120608/. These downloads were not authorized by rights 
holder HBO, and thus probably infringed (at the very minimum) the reproduction right granted in the 
Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) (2012).
22. The “BitTorrent protocol” is so resilient because it is an easily duplicated method for transferring files 
across the Internet. BitTorrent clients and trackers, which are programs that allow users to transmit files 
using the BitTorrent protocol, are easily reproduced, with much of the code publicly available and open 
source. As a result, there is little to be gained tactically (or monetarily) from suing a company or 
individual who provides BitTorrent services; shut down one provider, and a dozen imitators are 
immediately available. See Rebecca Giblin, Physical World Assumptions and Software World Realities (And 
Why There Are More P2P Software Providers Than Ever Before), 35 Colum. J.L. & Arts 57, 112–15 
(2011). For a more in-depth discussion of the pitfalls and possibilities associated with litigating against 
providers of BitTorrent protocol-related services, see Mark F. Schultz, Will BitTorrent Go the Way of 
Grokster?: File Sharing After MGM v. Grokster, A.B.A. SciTech Law., Winter 2006, at 4, 5–8; Rhys 
Boyd-Farrell, Comment, Legal Analysis of the Implications of MGM v. Grokster for BitTorrent, 11 Intell. 
Prop. L. Bull. 77, 80–86 (2006); Eric Waldman, Note, Going Straight: Whether P2P Technology Can Be 
Legitimized in the Wake of the Grokster Decision?, 15 Syracuse Sci. & Tech. L. Rep. 1 (2007).
23. Media Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–26, No. 12 Civ. 3719(HB), 2012 WL 3866492, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 
2012).
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download and upload pieces of the file from and to each other.”24 This creates an 
“interconnected web of information flowing between users,” or a “swarm.”25
 The users connected to a swarm send copies of these pieces to each other 
simultaneously. The BitTorrent “client”26 reassembles these pieces like a jigsaw 
puzzle.27 Eventually, every user connected to the swarm will have a complete copy of 
the file, or at least a copy of all the pieces that are available in the swarm.
 In order to connect to a swarm and download a file, a user generally needs a 
small torrent file and a connection to a tracker, which is a server elsewhere on the 
Internet that coordinates the distribution of the file or files to be downloaded.28 The 
torrent file contains data regarding the tracker as well as information about the files 
to be downloaded.
 To download a file using the BitTorrent protocol, a BitTorrent client must read 
the information in a torrent file.29 Upon opening a torrent file, the BitTorrent client 
announces itself to the tracker, which provides a list of up to two hundred IP 
addresses30 associated with other users currently connected to the swarm.31 The 
client connects to these other users and begins to download parts of the file. 
Periodically, the client will reconnect to the tracker, which will update the list of 
available IP addresses, allowing other users to join the swarm.32
 Because these IP addresses are visible, there is the potential to identify and track 
down the owner of each IP address through the use of monitoring software.33 This has 
led to a new copyright infringement litigation strategy that not only takes advantage of 
this vulnerability, but also exploits the collective nature of a BitTorrent swarm to attempt 
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The term “client” in this context is an industry term for a software application on the end user’s computer 
that coordinates the BitTorrent file-sharing transaction.
27. See Tom Chothia et al., The Unbearable Lightness of Monitoring: Direct Monitoring in 
BitTorrent 5 (2012), available at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~tpc/Papers/P2PSecComm2012.pdf. 
28. Id. Magnet links, which perform a similar function to torrent files but are not required to be downloaded 
to the user’s computer, are a common alternative to torrent files. E.g., Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and 
the Rope May Break: On the Secondary Liability of Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 19 Tex. 
Intell. Prop. L.J. 111, 153 (2010).
29. Chothia et al., supra note 27, at 5.
30. An IP address is a thirty-two-digit binary number that serves as a way of designating a computer’s 
“location” on the Internet. See Scott, supra note 6, at 450. The Internet service provider (ISP), which 
provides the Internet connection, assigns IP addresses to its customers, and is generally the only party 
who is able to link an individual IP address to a particular customer account, although even the ISP 
cannot tell who was “behind the keyboard” committing the infringement. See id. at 451–52.
31. See Chothia et al., supra note 27, at 6; Timothy B. Lee, Trading Popular Files on BitTorrent? You’ ll Be 
Spotted Within 3 Hours, Ars Technica (Sept. 4, 2012, 12:54 PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/09/trading-popular-files-on-bittorrent-youll-be-spotted-within-3-hours/.
32. Chothia et al., supra note 27, at 6.
33. For an in-depth discussion of BitTorrent monitoring software, its use, and its efficacy, see generally 
Chothia et al., supra note 27.
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to legally connect multiple users together into a single suit. These mass anonymous 
copyright infringement suits are also known as “swarm infringement” suits.
 B. A Quick Primer on Copyright Infringement and BitTorrent
 Copyright infringement is defined in the Copyright Act as a violation of “any of 
the exclusive rights of [a] copyright owner.”34 The use of BitTorrent implicates both 
the reproduction and distribution rights granted by the Copyright Act.35
 The reproduction right protects against unauthorized reproductions of any 
copyrighted work.36 Infringement of this right requires both access to a copyrighted 
file and that the reproduction be “substantially similar” to the copyrighted work.37 In 
BitTorrent file-sharing cases, most courts have little trouble finding that the 
reproduction right has been infringed,38 although one court has held that an 
incomplete BitTorrent download is not substantially similar to the original work until 
it is completed.39
 The distribution right provides the copyright owner with the exclusive right “to 
distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public.”40 The transfer of 
copyrighted files from one user to another violates this right, which implicates 
BitTorrent’s very nature.41 District courts disagree about whether the distribution 
right is violated merely by making files available via a peer-to-peer network without 
34. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012).
35. Id. § 106(1), (3).
36. See id. § 106(1).
37. See Jorgenson v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2003); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. 
Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998). The underlying work must also be protectable 
under the Copyright Act by fulfilling the originality and fixation requirements. However, as those 
requirements focus primarily on the copyrightability of the underlying work rather than the infringement 
of the work, there is little need to discuss them in this context.
38. See, e.g., Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.D.C. 2011); Columbia 
Pictures Indus. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578, 2009 WL 6355911 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) aff ’d in part, 
vacated in part, injunction modified in part, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 624 (2013).
39. Ingenuity 13 LLC v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-08333-ODW-JC, 2013 WL 765102, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 
2013) (“[D]ownloading data via the BitTorrent protocol is not like stealing candy. Stealing a piece of a 
chocolate bar, however small, is still theft; but copying an encrypted, unusable piece of a video file via 
the BitTorrent protocol may not be copyright infringement. In the former case, some chocolate was 
taken; in the latter case, an encrypted, unusable chunk of zeroes and ones. And as part of its prima facie 
copyright claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendants copied the copyrighted work. . . . If a download 
was not completed, Plaintiff ’s lawsuit may be deemed frivolous.”). For more information regarding the 
substantial similarity requirement and BitTorrent, see Declaration of Seth Schoen at 3–8, Ingenuity 13, 
2013 WL 765102 (No. 2:12-cv-08333-ODW-JC), ECF No. 117-3.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
41. Chothia et al., supra note 27, at 5–7. Hundreds of multiple-defendant swarm infringement cases have 
been filed across the country. Only two of these cases have aggregated defendants by using a method 
other than Rule 20 joinder, namely Rule 23. See Complaint, VPR Internationale, supra note 16; 
Complaint, OpenMind Solutions, supra note 16.
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actual proof of distribution.42 As a result, the BitTorrent protocol’s unique method of 
transferring files might also raise unsettled legal questions regarding infringement of 
the distribution right.43
iii. sWarM infringEMEnt sUits
 Swarm infringement litigation evolved from the antipiracy campaigns waged by 
the RIAA and the MPAA against individual users of file-sharing services from 
2003 to 2008.44 However, swarm infringement litigation differs from those previous 
campaigns in three very important ways. First, swarm infringement litigation’s true 
innovation is its sheer scale. BitTorrent, by its nature, groups many potential 
defendants together, allowing swarm infringement plaintiffs to use aggregate 
litigation techniques such as Rule 20 permissive joinder and Rule 23 defendant 
classes to sue numerous individual defendants in a single suit. Second, the plaintiffs 
in these cases are typically small independent movie studios or adult film production 
companies. Third, plaintiffs’ priority in these cases is to recover money through the 
simplest and quickest means possible, rather than obtain complete vindication of 
their rights under the Copyright Act.45 These differences illustrate the evolution of 
swarm infringement litigation from earlier anti-infringement campaigns. This Part 
provides a brief history of swarm infringement litigation and describes the strategy 
used by plaintiffs’ attorneys in such suits.
42. Compare, e.g., Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981–84 (D. Ariz. 2008), and 
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 176 (D. Mass. 2008), with Motown Record 
Co. v. DePietro, No. 04-CV-2246, 2007 WL 576284, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007), and Warner Bros. 
Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006). 
Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently declined to address this issue entirely 
despite its pivotal nature in the district court cases, preferring to rule on the narrower issue of whether 
the damages award was constitutional. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 
903–07 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 U.S. 1584 (2013).
43. For instance, it is ultimately unsettled whether merely making a copyrighted work available via 
BitTorrent infringes the distribution right. The exploration of these issues is beyond the scope of this 
note; however, for a discussion of the distribution right in light of pre-BitTorrent file-sharing litigation, 
see Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet 
Age, 59 J. Copyright Soc’y of the U.S.A. 201 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1679514; Diana Sterk, Comment, P2P File-Sharing and the Making Available War, 9 
Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 495 (2011); Vincent J. Galluzzo, Note, When “Now Known or Later 
Developed” Fails its Purpose: How P2P Litigation Has Turned the Distribution Right Upside-Down, 61 Fla. 
L. Rev. 1165 (2009).
44. See Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 2, at 2–4. 
45. For instance, until District Judge Baylson forced Malibu Media and several John Doe defendants to 
proceed to trial in an expedited manner in the so-called “bellwether trial” of Malibu Media, LLC v. John 
Does 1, 6, 13, 14, 950 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Pa. 2013), not a single swarm infringement case had been 
litigated past the pretrial stages, despite hundreds of cases against tens of thousands of defendants 
spanning nearly four years. A “bellwether trial” is a trial that involves “facts, claims, or defenses that are 
similar to the facts, claims, and defenses presented in a wider group of related cases.” Eldon E. Fallon et 
al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 2323, 2325 (2008). Such a trial “assist[s] 
in the maturation of disputes” by demonstrating the “strengths and weaknesses of their arguments and 
evidence, and . . . the risks and costs associated with the litigation.” Id.
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 A. The Evolution of Swarm Infringement Litigation
  1. Targeting the Technology: Suing the Service Providers
 To combat peer-to-peer file sharing of copyrighted content, content owners began 
by suing the creators of the peer-to-peer networks.46 They won several victories, 
including the Grokster case, which created an inducement standard for secondary liability 
that doomed most of the Napster-style file-sharing applications.47 With each victory, 
however, new and ever more decentralized methods for sharing files appeared, making 
it harder and harder to stop rampant infringement by suing the networks themselves.48
  2. Targeting the Infringers: Individual Copyright Infringement Lawsuits
 Because suing peer-to-peer networks proved ineffective, industry associations 
and other content owners switched tactics. By using software tools to collect the IP 
addresses of users on popular file-sharing networks, they targeted the actual 
individuals uploading and downloading copyrighted content.49 An IP address, 
however, only provides the “location” of the computer on the Internet, not the actual 
name or physical location of the person who committed the allegedly infringing act. 
In order to tie these IP addresses to an actual person, content owners must seek 
assistance from Internet service providers (ISPs), the only parties with access to both 
their clients’ IP addresses and their names and street addresses.50 Until this 
information is provided, defendants are unidentifiable, and content owners cannot 
serve them with a civil complaint or contact them to initiate settlement negotiations.
 In early cases, plaintiffs would file suit against an unidentified John Doe 
defendant whose IP address had been traced to allegedly infringing activity.51 
Because the defendant was unidentified, the plaintiff would then seek an ex parte 
46. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
47. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005); see also In re Aimster 
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 646; A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1019–22. 
48. For instance, Napster was vulnerable because its service utilized a centralized index server that contained 
a database of users and files. As a result, the entire Napster service could be easily shut down via court 
order. See Jeff Tyson, How the Old Napster Worked, HowStuffWorks, http://computer.howstuffworks.
com/napster2.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2014). In contrast, as explained in Part II, supra, the decentralized 
nature of the BitTorrent protocol makes it very difficult to shut down even a small portion of the total 
amount of infringing traffic by targeting a service provider or network that encouraged or enabled 
copyright infringement. Shutting down a single tracker, index website, or client provider has very little 
effect on the amount of infringement caused by BitTorrent traffic as a whole. See supra, note 22. While 
some torrent search indices and trackers have been shut down, it appears to have done little to stop 
BitTorrent traffic. See Tom Herrmann, Demonoid Taken Down by Ukranian Government; Domains for 
Sale, Int’l Bus. Times (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:10 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/demonoid-taken-down-
ukrainian-government-domains-sale-743141; Sandvine, supra note 18.
49. Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 2, at 2–3.
50. Id. at 2. 
51. Id. at 4; Paul Roberts, RIAA Sues 532 ‘John Does’, PCWorld (Jan. 21, 2004, 1:00 PM), http://www.
pcworld.com/article/114387/article.html.
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subpoena against the appropriate ISP in order to gain access to that defendant’s name 
and contact information.52 After the defendant was identified and served, the 
plaintiff ’s attorneys would typically contact him or her with settlement demands; if 
the defendant refused, the lawsuit could be amended to replace the John Doe 
defendant with the actual alleged infringer, and the case would proceed.53 This 
subpoena procedure had to be done quickly, as IP address assignments change on a 
regular basis.54
 Industry associations and other content owners filed thousands of parallel 
individual suits in this manner.55 Their desire to police and protect their rights was 
demonstrated by their willingness to litigate fully despite the contentious, difficult, 
and expensive nature of these cases. Nowhere was this more evident than in the case 
of Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset.56 There, the defendant, a single mother of 
four, was sued by major record labels, including Capitol Records and Virgin Records, 
for online file sharing.57 After she declined an initial settlement suggestion of $5,000, 
she went to trial four separate times in six years over the alleged copyright 
infringement of twenty-four songs, facing damages ranging from $54,000 to $1.92 
million.58 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit finally set the award at 
$222,000, or $9,250 per song.59 While this lawsuit alone almost certainly cost the 
record company plaintiffs far more than they were able to recover in damages, the 
message was clear: the industry was willing to litigate aggressively to enforce its 
copyright interests, no matter the cost.
52. Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 2, at 4. This proceeding is ex parte because no one knows who the 
accused are. “This means that [the plaintiff] generally gets to file [its] complaint and seek expedited 
discovery without opposition from any lawyer (though the ISPs have increasingly challenged what they 
view as burdensome mass subpoenas).” Nate Anderson, Meet Evan Stone, P2P Pirate Hunter, Ars 
Technica (Feb. 7, 2011, 2:31 PM EST), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/meet-evan-stone-
p2p-pirate-hunter/.
53. Anderson, supra note 52.
54. Broadband ISPs typically assign dynamic IP addresses to their subscribers. This avoids the administrative 
necessity of assigning specific static (unchanging) IP addresses to each device on the network, and it 
allows new devices to function in an essentially “plug and play” fashion, without requiring the end user 
to enter any configuration information. However, since these IP addresses are dynamic, they can (and 
do) change, although the typical IP address “lease” on a broadband modem is quite lengthy. See Ralph 
Droms, Bucknell Univ., Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 12 (1997), available at http://
tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc2131.pdf.
55. Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 2, at 10; Nate Anderson, Has the RIAA Sued 18,000 People . . . or 
35,000?, Ars Technica (July 8, 2009, 2:50 PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/07/
has-the-riaa-sued-18000-people-or-35000/.
56. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 U.S. 1584 
(2013).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 901–02.
59. Id. at 902.
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 This litigation strategy drew substantial criticism and public ire. Targeting 
creators of file-sharing networks was one thing; suing twelve-year-old children60 and 
single mothers61 for thousands or tens of thousands of dollars was quite another.62
 Further, using IP addresses as a basis to identify alleged infringers is inaccurate 
at best, as it only points to a particular Internet-connected device such as a router, 
modem, or networked printer, rather than the individual who committed the 
infringing act. The scale of the mainstream recorded music industry’s litigation 
strategy meant that many defendants were misidentified, which undermined public 
perceptions of the accuracy, fairness, and legitimacy of the litigation campaign.63 
These embarrassments fanned the f lames of anti-industry resentment and exposed 
the weaknesses inherent in using an IP address to find and sue infringers.
 In the end, this strategy of litigating against end users resulted in enormous 
pecuniary losses. For example, the main industry plaintiff, the RIAA, accrued 
almost fifty times more in investigative and legal fees than it earned via judgments 
and settlements.64 There was also mounting evidence that “[s]even years of copyright 
lawsuits have done little to stem the file-sharing tide; . . . most users don’t know or 
don’t care that the [industry’s] private police might be watching their downloads.”65 
The public ire and embarrassment inspired by the suits, combined with the associated 
financial losses, led large copyright owners to quietly withdraw from this strategy.66
60. John Borland, RIAA Settles with 12-Year-Old Girl, CNET (Sept. 9, 2003, 4:05 PM PDT), http://news.
cnet.com/2100-1027-5073717.html. 
61. Associated Press, Minnesota Woman Caught in Crackdown on Music Downloaders, USA TODAY (June 11, 
2004, 1:15 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/music/2004-05-26-riaa-vs-minnesotan_x.
htm.
62. Greg Sandoval, ‘Hurt Locker’ Producers Follow RIAA Footsteps, CNET (May 12, 2010, 4:34 PM PDT), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20004860-261.html (characterizing the RIAA’s campaign against 
individuals who illegally downloaded music as “a fantastic public relations f lub”).
63. For example, the RIAA sued Sarah Ward, a sixty-six-year-old Macintosh-using grandmother, for 
downloading “hard-core rap about baggy jeans and gold teeth” on a Windows-only file-sharing network. 
Chris Gaither, Recording Industry Withdraws Suit, Mistaken Identity Raises Questions on Legal Strategy, Bos. 
Globe (Sept. 24, 2003), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2003/09/24/recording_industry_
withdraws_suit/. In another case, the RIAA sued an eighty-three-year-old woman for distributing seven 
hundred songs via peer-to-peer networks; according to her daughter, the woman not only did not allow 
computers in her house, but had passed away months before. Eric Bangeman, “I Sue Dead People . . .”, Ars 
Technica (Feb. 4, 2005, 4:43 PM EST), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2005/02/4587-2/.
64. Ray Beckerman, Ha Ha Ha Ha Ha. RIAA Paid Its Lawyers More Than $16,000,000 in 2008 to Recover 
Only $391,000!!!, Recording Industry vs The People (July 13, 2010), http://recordingindustryvspeople.
blogspot.com/2010/07/ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-riaa-paid-its-lawyers.html (citing tax filings which indicate that 
between 2006 and 2008 the RIAA spent over $64 million in legal fees and investigative expenses to 
recover just over $1.3 million in settlements and judgments).
65. James Grimmelmann, Sealand, HavenCo, and the Rule of Law, 2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 405, 463; see also 
Elec. Frontier Found., supra note 2, at 9–10.
66. See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, Wall St. J. (Dec. 19, 2008, 
12:01 AM ET), http://on.wsj.com/16RjNsg; David Kravets, Copyright Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of 
RIAA Campaign, Wired (May 18, 2010, 1:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/05/riaa-
bump/.
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  3. Swarm Litigation: A New Way to Target the Infringers
 After almost a decade of legal battles, the traditional file-sharing model, in which 
one uploader sends a file to a single downloader, has become almost extinct.67 The 
BitTorrent protocol has risen to fill the void, and the amount of peer-to-peer traffic 
attributable to BitTorrent file transfers has grown to consume considerable amounts of 
bandwidth in recent years.68 With the widespread distribution of copyrighted works via 
the BitTorrent protocol, it was only a matter of time before BitTorrent users became the 
target of a new anti-infringement campaign.
 These swarm litigation suits borrow techniques from previous anti-infringement 
campaigns against file sharers. IP addresses are collected and used to locate potential 
“John Doe” infringers, and ISPs are subpoenaed to provide defendants’ contact 
information.69 Once plaintiffs have access to this information, they attempt to 
immediately settle the potential litigation.70 However, these suits differ from the mass 
individual suits that preceded them in several important ways.
 The primary innovation associated with swarm litigation, and indeed its defining 
feature, results from the very nature of BitTorrent’s protocol in transferring files. 
BitTorrent involves collecting file transfers among individuals in a swarm, and plaintiffs 
argue that should similarly allow them to collectivize their suits.71 Instead of filing 
thousands of individual suits in parallel, these swarm infringement cases use joinder 
under Rule 20 or the class action procedures under Rule 23 to file a single suit against 
67. Most of the major single-uploader/single-downloader services, including Napster, Grokster, and 
LimeWire, used centralized servers, proprietary or closed-source software, or an easily targeted 
corporate entity, which made them vulnerable to legal action. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Arista Records LLC v. Lime 
Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). As a result, very few major players remain in this 
realm; they have been replaced by file lockers, BitTorrent clients, streaming services, direct download 
services, and very small open-source peer-to-peer services. See Ernesto, Top 10 Largest File-Sharing Sites, 
TorrentFreak (August 27, 2011), https://torrentfreak.com/top-10-largest-file-sharing-sites-110828/; 
Chloe Albanesius, LimeWire Is Dead: What Are the Alternatives? PCMag (Oct. 27, 2010, 4:49PM EST), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2371590,00.asp.
68. See In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13093 (2008), vacated, 600 F.3d 542 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (McDowell, Comm’r, dissenting) (noting, in a proceeding discussing Comcast’s blocking of 
BitTorrent peer-to-peer connections, that “[s]ome estimate that seventy-five percent of the world’s 
Internet traffic is [peer-to-peer]”).
69. Nate Anderson, The RIAA? Amateurs. Here’s How You Sue 14,000+ P2P Users, Ars Technica (June 1, 
2010, 8:38 PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/06/the-riaa-amateurs-heres-how-you-
sue-p2p-users/. 
70. Id.
71. It is important to note that the district courts disagree about when collective litigation (whether 
implemented through Rule 20 joinder or through a Rule 23 defendant class) is appropriate in BitTorrent 
cases. Compare, e.g., AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–1058, 286 F.R.D. 39 (D.D.C. 2012) (allowing swarm 
infringement suits to proceed collectively under Rule 20 joinder), with Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 
1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), and Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1, 6, 13, 14, 950 F. Supp. 2d 
779 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding Rule 20 joinder improper in swarm infringement cases).
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dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of defendants.72 This ability to pursue numerous 
defendants cheaply with a single filing makes bringing these cases a profitable and 
sustainable endeavor, leading to a dramatic proliferation of swarm infringement cases 
in nearly every circuit throughout the country.73
 Additionally, swarm infringement lawsuits are no longer brought by major record 
labels, large film production studios, or deep-pocketed industry associations with 
enormous litigation budgets, as was the case in earlier anti-infringement campaigns.74 
Instead, these suits are typically brought by small independent film studios and adult 
entertainment companies,75 and they are generally prosecuted by a handful of individual 
lawyers and small law firms.76 This results in a dramatically different litigation strategy.
72. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Vazquez, No. 1:10-cv-00873-BAH (D.D.C. 
May 31, 2011), ECF No. 172, available at http://torrentfreak.com/ip-addresses-of-the-24583-hurt-locker-
victims-110524/ (naming 24,583 IP addresses as John Doe defendants); Complaint, OpenMind Solutions, 
supra note 16 (requesting defendant class certification against 2,925 John Doe defendants); Nate Anderson, 
Reverse Class-Action? It’s the Latest Tactic in the P2P Wars, Ars Technica (Feb. 5, 2011, 6:35 PM EST), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/reverse-class-action-its-the-latest-tactic-in-the-p2p-wars/.
73. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 69 (noting that the US Copyright Group, a single small law firm, “has 
managed the rare feat of making the RIAA campaign look slow-moving and small-scale,” and that the 
14,583 John Does sued by the US Copyright Group in the first six months of 2010 alone is more than twice 
the number of individuals sued by the RIAA at their peak in 2005). Dozens of cases have been filed in every 
circuit. See, e.g., (1st Cir.) Exquisite Multimedia, Inc. v. Does, No. 12-10813-MLW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
53457 (D. Mass Apr. 12, 2013); (2d Cir.) In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 
F.R.D. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); (3d Cir.) Battle Force, LLC v. Does 1–39, No. 12-6539-JBS-KMW, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 153933 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2013); (4th Cir.) Media Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–44, No. PJM 12-1292, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65641 (D. Md. May 10, 2012); (5th Cir.) TCYK, LLC v. Does 1–20, No. 
3:13-cv-3927-L, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174671 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2013); (6th Cir.) Killer Joe Nev., LLC 
v. Does 1–57, No. 3:13-CV-222, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172150 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 5, 2013); (7th Cir.) 
TCYK, LLC v. Does 1–87, No. 13 C 3845, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145722 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2013); (8th 
Cir.) W. Coast Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–71, No. 4:12CV01551 AGF, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140436 (E.D. 
Miss. Sept. 30, 2013); (9th Cir.) Malibu Media LLC v. Does 1–10, No. 2:12-cv-01642-RGK-SS, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8031 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013); (10th Cir.) Instinctive Film GmbH v. Does 1–15, No. 
13-cv-02143-WYD-MEH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117044 (D. Colo. Aug. 19, 2013); (11th Cir.) Ga. Film 
Fund Four, LLC v. Does 1–61, No. 1:13-CV-1076-RWS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101566 (N.D. Ga. July 
19, 2013); (D.C. Cir.) Hard Drive Prods. v. Does 1–1495, 892 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D.D.C. 2012). 
74. Eriq Gardner, New Litigation Campaign Quietly Targets Tens of Thousands of Movie Downloaders, 
Hollywood Reporter (Dec. 21, 2010, 10:56 AM PST), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/blogs/
thr-esq/litigation-campaign-quietly-targets-tens-63769 (noting that the Independent Film & Television 
Alliance (IFTA) and MPAA were not as of yet interested in pursuing this litigation strategy, and that 
the suits had been brought on behalf of independent film producers and not major studios).
75. See, e.g., In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. at 82 (noting that many of 
these civil actions have been “brought by purveyors of pornographic films”); David Kravets, Indie 
Filmmakers Sue Thousands of BitTorrent Users, Wired (Mar. 31, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://www.wired.
com/threatlevel/2010/03/bittorrent-legal-attack/. While the majority of these cases involve film studios, 
Century Media Ltd., a record label, has recently begun to file swarm infringement suits against 
downloaders of the heavy metal album Dystopia by the band Iced Earth. So far, almost 7,500 John Doe 
defendants have been sued for downloading these tracks in New Jersey. See Century Media Ltd. v. Does 
1–77, No. 2:12-cv-3911(DMC)(JAD), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27018 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2012).
76. Patrick Michaels, Evan Stone’s Battle Against Porn Pirates, Dall. Observer (Apr. 21, 2011), http://
www.dallasobserver.com/2011-04-21/news/barely-legal/.
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 B. Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Litigation Strategy: Settle, Settle, Settle!
 Having learned from the RIAA’s expensive and unpopular campaign against file 
sharing, the plaintiffs’ attorneys in swarm infringement cases approach their litigation 
strategy differently today. Their major objective is to “creat[e] a revenue stream and 
monetiz[e] the equivalent of an alternate distribution channel”—in other words, to 
earn as much money as possible for themselves and their clients by prosecuting alleged 
infringers.77 While plaintiffs’ attorneys certainly tout the punitive and deterrent effects 
of these cases, they have focused primarily on creating an economically sustainable, 
profitable business model; the litigation strategy is tailored to ensure this.78
 One important ingredient that makes this strategy sustainable is the plaintiff content 
owners’ relative immunity to the negative publicity that was typically associated with 
prior anti-infringement campaigns. Small independent film studios lack the household 
name recognition of the major production companies and are less damaged by negative 
coverage as a result, while the adult entertainment studios that bring a substantial 
portion of these cases have very little to lose in the public relations arena and much to 
gain by cracking down on piracy—especially if they can earn money while doing so.79
  1. Gathering IP Addresses and Identifying Defendants
 As before, the first step in these cases is identifying alleged infringers’ IP addresses. 
Recall that the nature of the BitTorrent protocol makes gathering IP addresses en 
masse relatively simple through the “harvesting” of IP addresses from a BitTorrent 
tracker.80 Plaintiffs then file a lawsuit using litigation procedures to bring as many John 
Does as possible to court in a single suit.81 This allows plaintiffs’ attorneys to create the 
largest possible pool of potential settlements for the least cost in time, filing fees, and 
77. Gardner, supra note 74; see also Nate Anderson, Shlockmeister Uwe Boll Sues 2,000 “Far Cry” P2P 
Downloaders, Ars Technica (Mar. 31, 2010, 2:39 PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2010/03/shlockmeister-uwe-boll-sues-2000-far-cry-p2p-downloaders/ (“What sets these cases 
apart [from the RIAA’s campaign is] that the parties think they can make money.”).
78. See Michaels, supra note 76 (noting that one plaintiffs’ lawyer claims that he is “trying to recoup revenue 
lost to piracy,” that he cares about protecting artists’ livelihoods, but also notes that he receives about 
45% of all settlement funds collected on behalf of his clients); see also Enigmax, Rights Holders Get 30% 
From Mass BitTorrent Litigation, TorrentFreak (Mar. 31, 2010), http://torrentfreak.com/rights-
holders-get-30-from-mass-bittorrent-litigation-100331/. 
79. Enigmax, supra note 78; Michaels, supra note 76; see also Patrick Michaels, This Ain’t Avatar. It’s Another 
Round of Federal Suits Against BitTorrent Porn Downloaders, Dall. Observer (Oct. 18, 2010, 3:05 PM), 
http://blogs.dallasobserver.com/unfairpark/2010/10/this_aint_avatar_its_another_r.php (quoting adult 
film studio president Michael Klein as saying that the pornography companies “don’t look at the suits as 
a money-making venture on their own—it’s about the long-term viability of the industry. From our 
group of studios, this is just the start of more of an organized effort to combat piracy”).
80. Chothia et al., supra note 27, at 2, 11. Remember, when a BitTorrent client initially connects to a tracker, that 
tracker sends the client a list of up to two hundred IP addresses belonging to other swarm members to facilitate 
the new user’s connection to the swarm. Id. A recent study found that members of popular swarms are likely to 
have their IP addresses logged by monitoring agencies within three hours. Id. at 15; see supra Part II.A.
81. The vast majority of these cases use Rule 20 joinder, however two experimental cases in Illinois have 
used the Rule 23 defendant class to sue thousands of defendants. See supra note 16. 
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motions.82 While courts have pushed back against the truly enormous cases involving 
thousands or tens of thousands of defendants,83 swarm litigation cases involving dozens 
of John Does still appear in staggering numbers.84
 Plaintiffs still subpoena defendants’ names and contact information from ISPs.85 
The primary difference is the sheer number of defendants, which is so large that ISPs 
have balked at the proliferation of requests.86 If a subpoena is granted, ISPs typically 
notify their customers, allowing defendants to move anonymously to quash these 
subpoenas.87 Nevertheless, plaintiffs’ attorneys unmask many John Does, and then 
move on to the profitable part of the litigation.
  2. Litigation Strategy or Settlement Strategy?
 So far, aside from the use of aggregate litigation mechanisms and some details 
relating to the use of BitTorrent, this strategy does not actually play out very differently 
from the preceding strategy of suing John Does individually in parallel. Once plaintiffs 
have secured defendants’ contact information, however, things change. Rather than 
following up settlement negotiations with actual litigation, swarm infringement 
plaintiffs’ litigation strategy generally begins and ends with procuring settlements.
 Generally, swarm infringement suits are not intended to be litigated to completion. 
Complex litigation, such as this, is expensive and time-consuming; plaintiffs’ attorneys 
tailor their strategy toward running a profitable legal campaign rather than protecting 
their clients’ copyright interests against every defendant who refuses to settle. As a 
result, very few cases move forward against nonsettling defendants once the subpoenas 
have been granted. In fact, only one swarm infringement case has ever been litigated 
to completion,88 despite the hundreds of these cases that have been filed.89 Most 
82. See In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
83. See, e.g., SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1–3036, No. 11–4220 SC, 2011 WL 6002620 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 
2011); On The Cheap, LLC v. Does 1–5011, 280 F.R.D. 500 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Diabolic Video Prods., 
Inc. v. Does 1–2099, No. 10-CV-5865-PSG, 2011 WL 3100404 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011).
84. See, e.g., Media Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–26, No. 12 Civ. 3719(HB), 2012 WL 3866492, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 4, 2012) (describing a list of over thirty such cases as “but a sample”).
85. See, e.g., Pac. Cent. Int’l Ltd. v. Does 1–101, No. C-11-02533-(DMR), 2011 WL 2690142 (N.D. Cal. 
July 8, 2011); Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.D.C. 2011).
86. Understandably, ISPs began to feel the administrative burden of this massive increase in subpoenas and 
began to place limits on the number of requests they would process. Michaels, supra note 76 (noting that 
Time Warner Cable has limited IP lookups to three per lawyer per month).
87. See, e.g., Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Hard Drive 
Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
88. See Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1, 6, 13, 14, 950 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Pa. 2013). Even then, the case 
only went to trial because the judge forced the parties to litigate through the mechanism of a bellwether 
trial, and the only issues remaining to be determined at trial were the damages that each individual 
defendant owed, as each had admitted liability prior to trial. Id.
89. Dan Browning, Lawyers in BitTorrent Copyright Trolling Cases Under Scrutiny, Star Tribune (Minneapolis) 
(Mar. 11, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.startribune.com/local/196795991.html (identifying “more than 
660 federal lawsuits filed by more than a dozen entities” as swarm infringement lawsuits).
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swarm litigation cases end when plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their own cases without 
prejudice, typically when they run into judicial resistance; further motion practice 
costs time and money, and plaintiffs would much rather focus on extracting settlement 
money.90 As a result, even after years of swarm litigation, district courts remain split 
on almost every aspect of a swarm infringement case, from whether to allow joinder 
to grounds for challenging subpoenas.91
 To effectuate the settlement process, plaintiffs’ attorneys send letters and make 
phone calls to convince defendants to settle for sums typically ranging between 
$1,500 and $7,500.92 Some even use automated calls that “strongly suggest[] that 
their recipients pay around $3,000 or risk being sued for $150,000 or more,”93 while 
others accept “all major credit cards” so as to expedite settlement collection.94 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys calculate settlement amounts just below the cost of mounting an 
effective defense to a claim of copyright infringement, ensuring that it is easier and 
cheaper for a defendant to pay the plaintiffs to go away rather than attempt to defend 
90. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Texas Chainsaw Massacre: Senior Judge “Severs” Most P2P Lawsuits, Ars 
Technica (Feb. 16, 2011, 4:33 PM EST), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/texas-chainsaw-
massacre-senior-judge-severs-most-p2p-lawsuits/ (noting that West Virginia District Judge Furgeson 
severed all but the first John Doe in several swarm litigation cases; the plaintiff then dropped all of 
those cases); see also Media Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–26, No. 12 Civ 3719(HB), 2012 WL 3866492 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (plaintiff voluntarily dismissed three joinder cases after the court severed all 
defendants beyond the first); Cindy Cohn, Mass Copyright Litigation: New Challenge for the Federal 
Courts, Elec. Frontier Found. (Apr. 19, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/04/mass-
copyright-litigation-new-challenge-federal (raising procedural, jurisdictional, and venue concerns 
associated with swarm litigation, and noting that some courts have dismissed or severed cases on these 
grounds, while others have not).
91. See, e.g., Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). This lack of litigation 
on the merits led District Judge Baylson in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to decide to move 
forward with a bellwether trial. See Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–16, 902 F. Supp. 2d 690, 702 (E.D. 
Pa. 2012). This forced the plaintiffs to fully litigate a test case against a small number of John Does on 
an expedited basis in the hopes of establishing precedent that would allow the speedy resolution of the 
case against the remaining John Does. Id. However, the only issue remaining by the time the case 
actually went to trial was the issue of damages, as the five John Does remaining in the case admitted 
liability and entered settlement agreements or high-low agreements with the plaintiffs prior to trial. See 
Malibu Media, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 780. As a result, the bellwether trial provides no guidance when the 
parties dispute liability.
92. Nate Anderson, Settle Up: Voicemails Show P2P Porn Law Firms in Action, Ars Technica (Apr. 20, 
2011, 6:50 PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/04/settle-up-voicemails-show-p2p-
porn-law-firms-in-action/; Greg Sandoval, Accused Pirates to Indie Filmmakers: Sue Us, CNET (Oct. 21, 
2010, 4:00 AM PDT), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20020260-261.html (listing settlement 
payments collected by lawyers for several films as ranging from $1,000 for a special, sympathetic case to 
$1,500 if an accused file sharer settled before a set date; if the accused individual delayed past the set 
date, the amount would increase to $2,500).
93. Reyhan Harmanci, The Pirates and Trolls of Porn Valley, Buzzfeed (Aug. 30, 2012, 11:32 AM EDT), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/reyhan/the-pirates-and-trolls-of-porn-valley. 
94. Defendant Login Page, DGLegal.com, http://web.archive.org/web/20111117075844/http://dglegal.
force.com/SiteLogindglegal (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (showing an archived snapshot of a law firm’s 
“Defendant Login Page” as it existed on November 17, 2012 during Dunlap, Grubb & Weaver’s swarm 
litigation campaigns, which prominently includes the text “All Major Credit Cards Accepted”).
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against the plaintiffs’ claims.95 While these settlement amounts are much lower than 
statutory damages for infringement under the Copyright Act,96 the threat of 
enormous damage awards places significant pressure on defendants to settle—
pressure that is only exacerbated by the potential embarrassment associated with 
being publicly sued for downloading pornographic films.97 These tactics are 
undeniably effective.98
iV.  dEfEndant CLass aCtiOns arE an inapprOpriatE VEhiCLE fOr sWarM 
infringEMEnt CasEs
 Courts are split on whether to allow plaintiffs to use Rule 20 to join multiple 
defendants. Some courts have allowed the cases to proceed, while others have severed 
defendants on jurisdictional, fundamental fairness, or trial management grounds.99 
95. Indeed, in cases where the plaintiffs set higher amounts for settlements, defendants have occasionally 
hired lawyers and fought back. For instance, in Malibu Media, LLC. v. Lee, No. 12-03900, 2013 WL 
2252650 (D.N.J May 22, 2013), plaintiffs set settlement demands slightly higher, at around $10,000. 
See Defendant Gregory Tarris’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion to Dismiss, 
Malibu Media, 2013 WL 2252650 (No. 12-03900), ECF No. 38. This brief was closely followed by a 
sua sponte Order to Show Cause from District Judge Michael A. Shipp as to why all John Does except 
the first should not be severed and dismissed without prejudice. See Order to Show Cause, Malibu 
Media, 2013 WL 2252650 (No. 12-03900), ECF No. 40. The plaintiffs then dismissed all claims 
against all anonymous defendants, leaving only a few named individuals within the suit who continued 
to oppose the plaintiffs.
96. Courts may award damages ranging from $750 to $30,000 per infringement, or up to $150,000 if an 
infringement is found to be “willful.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
97. See Malibu Media LLC v. John Doe Subscriber Assigned IP Address 24.183.51.58, No. 13-cv-205-
wmc, 2013 WL 4821911, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 10, 2013) (sanctioning plaintiff for its “regular 
practice” of publicly filing as an exhibit a list of “particularly lewd and obscene” titles that the defendant 
had allegedly downloaded, and that the plaintiff did not own, which only served to “harass and 
intimidate defendants into early settlements by use of the salacious nature of others’ materials, rather 
than the merit of its own copyright claims”); Digital Sins, Inc. v. Does 1–245, No. 11 Civ. 8170(CM), 
2012 WL 1744838, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012) (noting that “the nature of the alleged copyright 
infringement—the downloading of an admittedly pornographic movie—has the potential for forcing 
coercive settlements, due to the potential for embarrassing the defendants, who face the possibility that 
plaintiff ’s thus-far-unsubstantiated and perhaps erroneous allegation will be made public”).
98. See Michaels, supra note 76 (quoting a plaintiffs’ attorney that 40% of defendants settle these claims); 
Anderson, supra note 92 (noting that the plaintiff ’s attorney in Future Blue, Inc. v. Does 1–300, No. 
10-cv-06256 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2011) voluntarily dismissed claims against fifteen defendants in order to 
settle claims at an estimated rate of $2,900 each, or $43,500 in total, at the cost of a $350 filing fee). 
The sheer profitability of these cases ensures that this litigation strategy will remain sustainable and 
that swarm infringement cases will remain plentiful for the foreseeable future. Cohn, supra note 90 
(observing that, in the fifteen months preceding April 2011, 130 swarm infringement cases against 
135,000 defendants had been filed).
99. Compare, e.g., AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–1058, 286 F.R.D. 39 (D.D.C. 2012) (allowing suits to 
proceed under Rule 20 joinder), with Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). See also Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Boy Racer v. Does 
2–52, No. C 11–02834 LHK (PSG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86746, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011).
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As judicial resistance to Rule 20 cases has grown, plaintiffs’ attorneys have continued 
to innovate, testing other potential strategies.100
 Recently, plaintiffs’ attorneys have sought to circumvent jurisdictional and 
joinder-related problems through the use of class action procedures under Rule 23.101 
No court has ruled on the availability of Rule 23 in swarm suits; the plaintiffs 
voluntarily dismissed the only two such suits that have been filed after both cases sat 
idle for almost a year.102 This Part argues that a swarm infringement defendant class 
is uncertifiable under Rule 23, and therefore Rule 20 should be the only available 
method for joining defendants in swarm infringement suits.
 Part IV.A explains how the permissive joinder rules under Rule 20 are applied in 
swarm infringement cases. Part IV.B discusses the legal basis for allowing both 
plaintiff and defendant classes under Rule 23. Part IV.C evaluates the class 
certification requirements for a defendant class under Rule 23, and argues that such 
classes do not satisfy Rule 23’s requirements.
 A. Permissive Joinder Under Rule 20
 The vast majority of swarm infringement cases group defendants through the Rule 
20 permissive joinder provisions.103 Rule 20 allows a plaintiff to join additional 
defendants to an action if “any right to relief is asserted against them . . . with respect 
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences; and . . . any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in 
the action.”104
 Plaintiffs in swarm infringement cases argue that defendants participate in the 
same “series of transactions” under Rule 20 when they download a file cooperatively 
through a BitTorrent swarm.105 While some courts have found this argument 
persuasive, a growing number find joinder to be improper and tend to sever all joined 
defendants.106 This uncertainty (as well as the growing judicial awareness of and 
100. See, e.g., Stipulated Motion for Expedited Discovery, AF Holdings LLC v. Ciccone, No. 4:12–
cv–14442–GAD–MKM (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2013), ECF No. 10 (adding an additional three hundred 
John Doe defendants to an ostensibly single-defendant copyright infringement suit); houstonlawy3r, 
Why CEG-TEK’s DMCA Settlement System Will Fail, TorrentLawyer (Feb. 22, 2013), http://
torrentlawyer.wordpress.com/2013/02/22/six-strikes-system-effects-on-ceg-tek-dmca-copyright-
letters/ (describing how one firm seeks to avoid litigation altogether by sending out low-value “DMCA” 
settlement notices through ISPs to alleged infringers without actually filing a lawsuit).
101. See supra note 41; Anderson, supra note 72. 
102. See supra note 41.
103. See id.
104. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
105. Sean B. Karunaratne, The Case Against Combating BitTorrent Piracy Through Mass John Doe Copyright 
Infringement Suits, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 283, 295 (2012).
106. Compare, e.g., AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–1058, 286 F.R.D. 39 (D.D.C. 2012) (allowing suits to 
proceed under Rule 20 joinder), with Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (finding the use of Rule 20 joinder improper and severing all John Does beyond the first from the 
case). See also Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Boy Racer v. Does 2–52, 
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hostility to these cases) has resulted in plaintiffs’ attorneys looking to the defendant 
class action as an alternative way to group defendants.107
 B. Defendant Class Actions Under Rule 23
 The class action has become a mainstay of litigation in many areas, and for good 
reason. It increases judicial efficiency and consistency on a grand scale, allowing 
dozens of similar or identical claims to be decided at once. A key part of what makes 
class actions so effective and powerful is that a ruling for or against a class has the 
power to bind all members of that class, even those members not before the court.108
 Plaintiffs must satisfy several requirements under Rule 23 to successfully certify a 
defendant class, including the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy 
requirements. These requirements protect so-called “absent”109 class members from 
potential due process violations (which would result from litigating their interests 
without their direct involvement).110 A failure to meet any of these Rule 23 
requirements indicates that the proposed class definition, class representatives, or 
class counsel inadequately protect the due process interests of all class members 
involved in the litigation. A court must deny certification if any of these requirements 
are not met. Further, Rule 23 requires predominance and superiority in cases seeking 
monetary damages in order to ensure that an expensive and complex class action is 
superior to all other methods of adjudicating the case (in terms of trial management 
and judicial efficiency). Thus, the Rule 23 class certification requirements are critical 
to protecting each class member’s due process rights.111
 Although most class actions involve a class of plaintiffs suing one or more 
individual defendants, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also allow an individual 
to sue a defendant class, in that a class may “sue or be sued.”112 Beyond that language, 
the rules do little to distinguish plaintiff and defendant classes. Both classes must 
fulfill the same Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequate representation, and both must fall within one of the “niches carved out by 
Rule 23(b),” which add additional predominance and superiority requirements for 
actions to recover money damages.113 The purposes of collective suits are, for the 
No. C 11–02834 LHK (PSG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86746, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011) (“[T]he 
nearly six-week span covering the activity associated with each of the addresses calls into question 
whether there was ever common activity linking the 51 addresses in this case.”). See Karunaratne, supra 
note 105, for an in-depth discussion of joinder- and misjoinder-related issues and related holdings in 
Rule 20 swarm infringement cases. 
107. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
108. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808–09 (1985).
109. Absent class members are parties that are not directly involved in the litigation process, but who will 
nonetheless be bound by the court’s decision.
110. William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions §§ 1:6, 1:10(2) (5th ed. 2013).
111. Id.
112. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added).
113. Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2003).
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most part, also applicable to both plaintiff and defendant class actions: “(i) access to 
justice; (ii) deterrence or policing behaviors; (iii) equilibrium of the parties in 
litigation; (iv) judicial and process resources economy; and (v) avoidance of 
incompatible adjudication.”114
 Absent individuals in any class action proceeding face the possibility of an 
adverse judgment without any participation. While Rule 23 itself treats defendant 
and plaintiff classes similarly, courts are more solicitous of the due process rights of a 
defendant class,115 whose members face all of the consequences, costs, and potential 
losses of an adverse judgment entered against them should the representative class 
members fail to protect their interests (not to mention they may be required to 
appear, to participate in discovery, and will be subjected to the law of a forum with 
which they had no minimum contacts).116 Plaintiff classes typically only lose their 
right to sue for recovery, a loss that courts have generally held to be less substantial 
than that of an absent defendant, especially in light of a plaintiff ’s ability to “opt out” 
of certain class actions in order to bring suit on his or her own.117 Courts therefore 
treat defendant classes with “special solicitude” based on this risk of loss, and are 
particularly sensitive to any certification issues that might develop.118
 C. Rule 23 Class Action Prerequisites
  1. The Implicit Requirement of Definiteness
 A proposed class must be “definite enough that the class can be ascertained.”119 If 
a court cannot ascertain whether an individual is a member of the proposed class 
from the definition without conducting a mini-trial for each class member, the class 
is not sufficiently “definite” to support certification.120 Indeed, a question of 
certification that overlaps with the merits would contravene Rule 23 by allowing a 
114. Nelson R. Netto, The Optimal Law Enforcement with Mandatory Defendant Class Action, 33 U. Dayton 
L. Rev. 59, 87 (2007).
115. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Corrao, 161 F.3d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Tilley, 345 F.3d at 37; Flying 
Tiger Line, Inc. v. Cent. States Sw. & Se. Areas Pension Fund, No. 8–304 CMW, 1986 WL 13366, at 
*4 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 1986).
116. Elizabeth B. Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members of a Defendant Class: A Proposed Revision of Rule 23, 
1990 BYU L. Rev. 909, 913–14 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808–12 (1985)); 
Newberg on Class Actions, supra note 110, §§ 1:6, 1:10(2).
117. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 808–12.
118. Pabst Brewing, 161 F.3d at 439; see also Tilley, 345 F.3d at 37; Flying Tiger Line, 1986 WL 13366, at *4.
119. Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Alliance to End Repression v. 
Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1977)). This is one of the “implicit requirements” of class 
certification, in that it is not explicitly laid out in Rule 23 but is necessary for a class action to proceed. 
Newberg on Class Actions, supra note 110, § 3:1; see also J. Russell Jackson, The Touchstone of Class 
Certification: The Class Definition, CADS Rep., Winter 2011, at 3, available at http://blog.wexlerwallace.
com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/CADS_Report_Winter_2011-00203107.pdf.
120. Romberio v. Unumprovident Corp., 385 F. App’x 423, 430–31, 445 (6th Cir. 2009); Jackson v. Se. Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 260 F.R.D. 168, 182 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Mueller v. CBS, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 441, 445 
(E.D. Pa. 1995)).
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plaintiff “to secure the benefits of a class action without first satisfying the 
requirements. He [would] thereby [be] allowed to obtain a determination on the 
merits of the claims advanced on behalf of the class without any assurance that a 
class action may be maintained.”121
 This poses a problem for plaintiffs in swarm infringement suits, as it is difficult 
to craft a class definition that can apply to individuals beyond the plaintiff ’s list of IP 
addresses. So far, plaintiffs have attempted to define a relevant class to include not 
just the thousands of John Does “named” in the suit, but all individuals who “engaged 
in copyright infringement activity via BitTorrent . . . against Plaintiff ’s copyrighted 
works.”122 Such a definition is actually indefinite and requires a determination, on 
the merits, that each defendant has “engaged in copyright infringement activity” 
before the class can be certified. As a result, this kind of class is uncertifiable on 
definiteness grounds, even before reaching the other Rule 23 requirements.
  2. The Numerosity Requirement
 The numerosity requirement checks whether there are so many putative class 
members that “ joinder of all members is impracticable”;123 it also ensures that a class 
action is the best way to proceed.124 While there is no strict numerosity threshold, 
federal courts have held that a putative class consisting of forty or more members is 
presumptively sufficient to satisfy this requirement.125 This is hardly a concern with 
regard to swarm infringement suits, as plaintiffs in these cases have shown that they 
are willing to sue hundreds or thousands of defendants at once.126 As a result, the 
question of numerosity is one of the only class action requirements that swarm 
infringement plaintiffs can easily meet.
121. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974).
122. Complaint, OpenMind Solutions, supra note 16, ¶ 32.
123. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). In the context of swarm infringement precedent, however, it may be possible to 
argue that joinder may be “practicable,” thus making a class action proceeding inappropriate even in 
situations where the putative defendant class would be very large. After all, courts in previous swarm 
infringement suits have allowed the Rule 20 joinder of as many as 23,322 individual defendants. Nu 
Image, Inc. v. Does 1–23322, 799 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2011). Other courts, however, have found 
joinder to be completely inappropriate in swarm infringement cases. See, e.g., Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 
1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
124. When available and practical, joinder is generally preferable to class action treatment. In a joinder case, 
all parties are before the court, and therefore there is less need to worry about the due process concerns 
of absent defendants.
125. See Newberg on Class Actions, supra note 110, at § 3:12 n.9 (collecting cases in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits that presume the 23(a)(1) numerosity requirement is met when the putative class has at least 
forty members).
126. In OpenMind Solutions v. Does 1–2925, the plaintiffs certainly erred on the conservative side when it came 
to the numerosity requirement, identifying 2,925 potential Doe defendants and setting forth a defendant 
class definition that could have included even more. Complaint, OpenMind Solutions, supra note 16, ¶ 32.
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  3. The Commonality Requirement
 The commonality requirement asks whether “there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class.”127 The commonality requirement will generally be met if there 
is at least one “common question which is at the heart of the case.”128 Such a common 
question must be a “subject or point open to controversy,” not merely a rhetorical 
question.129 As recently interpreted by the Supreme Court, “What matters to class 
certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’ . . . but rather the capacity 
of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of 
the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential 
to impede the generation of common answers.”130
 Commonality can be difficult to prove in swarm infringement cases because 
there tend to be relatively few common questions that could generate “common 
answers.” For instance, a plaintiff cannot rely on a common question of whether 
“copying” occurred within the meaning of the Copyright Act, as “[i]t is very likely 
that each John Doe will assert different defenses, thereby adding factual and legal 
questions that are not common among all the defendants.”131 Each of these claims 
raises different questions of fact and requires different types of proof.132
 While commonality can be difficult to prove in these cases, the requirement 
could be satisfied because whether the plaintiff owns the work(s) at issue may suffice 
as a single “common question” of law or fact.133 A plaintiff must prove ownership 
over a work to establish a prima facie case of infringement.134 Although courts loathe 
127. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 
128. Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992).
129. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2562 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 2551 (majority opinion) (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate 
Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)).
131. Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165, 169–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). One commentator has 
argued that commonality is relatively simple to meet because “the main defenses available to class 
members will be fair use and copyright misuse . . . [which] will be relying on the same underlying works 
. . . .” Brian Noh, Fair Copyright Litigation: The Reverse Class Action Lawsuit, 9 Hastings Bus. L.J. 123, 
131–32 (2012). This argument entirely misses the numerous and varied factual arguments that 
defendants raise in these actions to show that they may not have been the individual committing the 
allegedly infringing conduct at all. 
132. For instance, individuals who claimed that their IP addresses were misidentified would have to present 
different factual proof (such as an affidavit from an ISP) than individuals who argued that someone else 
had downloaded the file in question (perhaps by a showing that their wireless routers were unsecured 
and near a public area).
133. See Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018.
134. Ingenuity 13 LLC v. John Doe, No. 2:12-cv-08333, 2013 WL 765102, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2013) 
(indicating that the validity of the copyright assignments that transferred ownership of the films to 
plaintiffs was in question); see also Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff ’s Amended Complaint Under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7) and Motion to Strike Paragraph 53 of Plaintiff ’s Amended Complaint 
Under Fed. R Civ. P. 12(f) at ¶ 1, Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–16, 902 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Pa. 
2012) (No. 12-cv-02088-MMB), ECF No. 55-1.
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certifying classes based on time-consuming questions of intellectual property 
ownership,135 if only a few works are at issue a court might reasonably find that a 
common question of ownership fulfills the commonality requirement.
 Even if it is possible that a swarm infringement defendant class could fulfill the 
commonality requirement, the proposed class must still fulfill the typicality, 
adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements to obtain class action 
certification. These other requirements are extremely difficult (if not impossible) for 
plaintiffs to overcome in swarm litigation.
  4. The Typicality Requirement
 This requirement protects the due process rights of absent class members by 
ensuring the class representatives’ interests are “typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class,” and, therefore, that the class representatives’ goals are aligned with those 
of the absent class members.136 This requirement is particularly troublesome for 
courts when dealing with a defendant class, as the plaintiff seeking class certification 
chooses the defendant class’s representative parties.137 The onus falls on the court to 
ensure that the selected class representatives have “claims or defenses” that are 
“typical” of the other members of the proposed class.138
 Courts have found that defendant classes “are more likely than plaintiff classes to 
include members whose interests diverge from those of the named representatives,”139 
and that “[r]isks of diverging interests are particularly high in actions seeking 
monetary remedies,” as each individual’s risk tolerance, goals, and preferred litigation 
strategy are different.140 Mass infringement joinder cases under Rule 20 follow this 
trend, with some individuals willing to fight much harder than others.141
 Further, in order to meet the typicality requirement there must be a “typical” class 
member in the defendant class. In these swarm cases, no such typical member exists. 
Members of a putative swarm infringement defendant class often raise a wide range of 
135. Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google, Inc., 254 F.R.D. 521, 528 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (denying certification of a 
plaintiff class on predominance grounds due to the unmanageability of determining ownership of 
intellectual property on a classwide level for an enormous plaintiff class).
136. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
137. Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 685, 710 (2005). This differs from a 
typical plaintiff class action in that a plaintiff class typically gets to select its own representative parties.
138. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
139. Ameritech Benefit Plan Comm. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 220 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 2000).
140. Id. Some individuals might be solely focused on dealing with the claims against them as cheaply as 
possible; others may seek to avoid humiliation and clear their names; still others might be willing to 
litigate to a certain point and settle if the case becomes too expensive; and others may seek to challenge 
the entire swarm litigation strategy.
141. In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 83–84 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(showing that some individuals settled, some contested on factual grounds, and others hired counsel).
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individually fact-specific defenses.142 Evaluating each of these factual defenses requires 
discovery and adjudication based on each defendant’s unique factual circumstances—
an inherently individualized inquiry, and one that does not support a finding of 
typicality.143 Because of this, a class representative whose claims or defenses would be 
“typical” to those of the other alleged infringers in the class would not exist. This 
weighs heavily against finding typicality in the swarm infringement litigation context.
  5. The Adequacy Requirement
 One of the most important and complex requirements for certification of a class 
action is that the “representative parties [must] fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class.”144 The adequacy requirement is a ref lection of the fundamental due 
process issue that can arise as a result of a class action: individuals who are not in court 
and who are not directly involved in the suit will have their rights or property affected 
by a verdict.145 The adequacy requirement ensures that the class representatives and 
their counsel can handle the complex litigation at hand.146
 For plaintiff class actions, obtaining and paying for counsel capable of adequately 
representing the interests of a plaintiff class is generally a simple proposition. Plaintiff 
classes nominate their own representatives, and plaintiffs’ attorneys are typically 
compensated out of the settlement or a common fund generated by their efforts.147 
For cases seeking injunctive or declarative relief, plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees can be 
requested under Rule 23(h).148
 A defendant class representative, however, cannot rely on similar fee incentives. 
The defendant class is litigating not for monetary gain, but to protect the status quo; 
if they win, “the defendants owe nothing to the plaintiff—no money changes 
hands.”149 “Consequently, the defendant representative must be prepared to assume 
142. See id. (noting that the vastly different factual defenses include “I was at work at the time of the 
infringement” and “I am morally opposed to pornography, but my wireless network was hacked”).
143. While courts have the discretion to divide classes into subclasses, the factual defenses raised by defendants 
in these cases require individualized findings that are simply not amenable to aggregate adjudication. Even 
ignoring the factual defenses, if every defendant asserting a fair use defense to infringement were to be 
aggregated into a subclass as argued in Noh, supra note 131, at 133, the fact-specific nature of the fair use 
inquiry would require individualized discovery, hearings, and determinations for each defendant.
144. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
145. See Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1770 (3d ed. 1998).
146. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1).
147. E.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (“[A] litigant or lawyer who recovers a 
common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.”); see also, e.g., Maley v. Del Global Techs. Corp., 186 F. Supp. 
2d 358, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[C]lass counsel who create a settlement fund for the benefit of a class are 
entitled to be compensated for their services from that settlement fund.”); Sternberg v. Citicorp Credit 
Servs., Inc., 442 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 1981) (“[T]he judgment fund and its accrued 
interest is the appropriate source for the payment of the attorney fees.”).
148. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h).
149. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 137, at 691.
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some, if not all, of the economic burden of the litigation.”150 In a defendant class 
action, it often falls to the plaintiffs (as the parties moving for class certification) to 
determine which defendant or defendants to select as class representatives. This 
creates the risk that the plaintiff, wanting to win the case, may not pick the “best” 
representative party.151 In swarm infringement cases, close judicial review is necessary 
because “no single defendant is in a position to serve as a representative for the entire 
class.”152 Further, defendants typically do not want to be named as class representatives. 
“The major reason for their opposition presumably is a desire to avoid a possible 
increase in litigation expenses if they represent a class, in light of the fact that no 
[other] source of funds is available to pay for any additional costs.”153 If a defendant 
class is certified, the class representative must retain and pay for adequate counsel, 
with no guarantee that any other defendant will help bear the heavy financial burden 
associated with defending and coordinating a complex class action.154
 Concerns about adequate representation are heightened in swarm infringement 
defendant class actions. It is more difficult to find and finance adequate class counsel 
when the class consists primarily of average people who lack the deep pockets 
necessary to pay for defending an expensive and time-consuming class action suit. 
The court must take additional care to ensure that counsel is both adequate and 
adequately financed in these situations, and that the named representatives will 
sufficiently represent the interests of the class.
 This is difficult, as there are several possible ways of paying for counsel, but none 
are satisfactory. One option is for defendants to voluntarily contribute as much as 
they want to the defense, but there is little incentive for any of the nonrepresentative 
class members to do so, creating a “free rider” problem.155 Another option is for 
defendants to pay as much as they would need to defend themselves individually; 
however, individuals would likely be unwilling to pay more than it would cost to 
settle. This would be suboptimal, since mounting a defense would be less certain 
than simply paying the settlement costs to the plaintiffs and avoiding the time, 
effort, and risk of litigation entirely. Finally, the representative defendants could try 
to require codefendants to contribute a fair share, but there is no authority to enforce 
such a provision and they would have to sue their codefendants for contribution. For 
these reasons, funding adequate counsel in defendant class actions continues to 
stymie courts and commentators alike.156
150. Brandt, supra note 116, at 920.
151. See Francis X. Shen, The Overlooked Utility of the Defendant Class Action, 88 Denv. U. L. Rev. 73, 116–
17 (2010).
152. Id. at 118.
153. Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 648 (1978).
154. See Shen, supra note 151, at 85–86.
155. Id. at 86.
156. Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 237–38 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J., concurring) 
(indicating that there is no definitive rule for distribution of attorneys’ fees in class actions); see also 
Brandt, supra note 116, at 919. Several commentators argue for fee-shifting reforms to fix this f lawed 
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  6. Other Rule 23 Considerations
 For a class action to be maintained, not only do the prerequisites laid out in Rule 
23(a) have to be met, but the case must also fall into one of the categories identified 
in Rule 23(b). Currently, only Rule 23(b)(3) supports any sort of swarm infringement 
copyright action, as courts have found 23(b)(1)(A),157 23(b)(1)(B),158 and 23(b)(2)159 
class actions uncertifiable in similar contexts. As a result, any swarm infringement 
defendant class must also satisfy the additional 23(b)(3) predominance and superiority 
requirements, which ensure that a class action can be adjudicated in an efficient and 
workable manner.
   a. Predominance
 Courts have held that the predominance requirement is essentially a “more 
demanding” version of the commonality requirement because it not only requires 
common issues that link class members together, but also that these common issues 
system. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 137, at 715–18; Netto, supra note 114, at 113–16; Shen, 
supra note 151, at 122–25. One commentator who advocates strongly for the use of defendant classes 
notes that the adequacy requirement would bar certification in a copyright infringement litigation 
against a class of anonymous defendants: 
In this hard case [involving mass copyright infringement alleged against a class of 
anonymous defendants] . . . the court [would] incur tremendous costs and essentially fund 
a legal team for the defendant class. The great majority of the defendant class remains 
anonymous, and thus would not contribute to a pool to fund the legal fees. Given these 
prohibitive costs . . . here, defendant class actions will not be an optimal legal tool.
 Shen, supra note 151, at 118–19. Commentators argue that there are cases when a defendant class would 
benefit as a whole from pooling funds to defend against the plaintiff ’s claims. This might well be true in 
situations where the defendants are more sophisticated, better organized, and have an incentive to cooperate. 
However, here, where most defendants are unsophisticated, anonymous, and just want to get out with as little 
money spent as possible, there is little incentive for them to contribute money to the class defense.
157. Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2003); Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier 
Foundation Regarding Proceeding as a Class Action at 2 n.2, OpenMind Solutions v. Does 1–2925, 
No. 3:11–cv–00092 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2011), ECF No. 33 [hereinafter EFF Amicus Brief, OpenMind 
Solutions]. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) allows class actions in cases where there is a risk of imposing “incompatible 
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.” Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). This cannot apply to 
a swarm infringement suit because the party opposing the class in a defendant class action is a plaintiff, 
and an infringement verdict sets a standard of conduct for a defendant. See, e.g., Winder Licensing, Inc. 
v. King Instrument Corp., 130 F.R.D. 392 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (refusing to certify a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) 
defendant class in a patent infringement case for this reason).
158. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) supports a class action where “adjudications with respect to individual class 
members . . . would be dispositive of the interests of the other [absent class] members not parties to the 
individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.” 
Id. There is no such situation here, as an individualized adjudication against one defendant would not 
affect the absent class members’ interests. EFF Amicus Brief, OpenMind Solutions, supra note 157, at 2 
n.2 (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Midland Bancor Inc., 158 F.R.D. 681, 687 (D. 
Kan. 1994)); see also In re Dennis Greenman Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1545–46 (11th Cir. 1987).
159. Henson v. E. Lincoln Twp., 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant class actions 
under Rule 23(b)(2) are barred because “[a]lways it is the alleged wrongdoer, the defendant—never the 
plaintiff . . . who will have ‘acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class’”).
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“predominate” over individual, uncommon ones.160 “Class-wide issues predominate if 
resolution of some of the legal or factual questions that qualify each class member’s case 
as a genuine controversy can be achieved through generalized proof, and if these particular 
issues are more substantial than the issues subject only to individualized proof.”161
 In swarm infringement cases, commonality is already an uphill battle due to the 
difficulty inherent in finding questions of law or fact common to the class when each 
defendant can raise distinct claims and affirmative defenses against a charge of 
infringement.162 The predominance requirement is, therefore, far more difficult to meet.
 The wide range of claims and defenses163 that can be raised by defendants would 
necessitate dozens or hundreds of individual depositions, discovery requests, 
subpoenas, evidentiary hearings, and mini-trials to effectively adjudicate each claim 
or defense, which would “add another layer to an already fact-specific inquiry that the 
court must delve into.”164 Thus, these “uncommon” issues would likely predominate 
over any common questions of law or fact that could be adjudicated en masse, thereby 
defeating the predominance requirement and preventing class certification.
   b. Superiority
 This requirement seeks to ensure that class action litigation is the proper vehicle 
to adjudicate the parties’ claims.165 If “class certification only serves to give rise to 
hundreds or thousands of individual proceedings requiring individually tailored 
remedies, it is hard to see how . . . a class action would be the superior means to 
adjudicate the claims.”166
 Because each Rule 23 requirement (excluding numerosity) will require individual 
hearings, proceedings, and mini-trials to determine whether the class should be 
160. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–34 (1997).
161. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2010). Identical or similar definitions 
exist in other circuits. See, e.g., Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 
2011); Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 84 F. App’x 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2004); Kerr v. City of W. Palm 
Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1557–58 (11th Cir. 1989).  
162. Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 2008) (“An affirmative defense is not per 
se irrelevant to the predominance inquiry, as the parties seem to believe. We have noted that the 
‘predominance of individual issues necessary to decide an affirmative defense may preclude class 
certification.’”); Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 438 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[L]ike other 
considerations, affirmative defenses must be factored into the calculus of whether common issues 
predominate.”); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[A]
ffirmative defenses should be considered in making class certification decisions.”). See supra Part IV.C.iii.
163. In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting 
that defendants can “raise[] a panoply of individual defenses, including age, religious convictions, and 
technological savvy; misidentification of ISP accounts; the kinds of WiFi equipment and security 
software utilized; and the location of defendant’s router. The individualized determinations required far 
outweigh the common questions in terms of discovery, evidence, and effort required”).
164. Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google, Inc., 254 F.R.D. 521, 531 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
165. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
166. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2008).
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certified, a swarm infringement defendant class runs afoul of this superiority 
requirement at almost every stage of the certification process. If the class were to be 
certif ied, it would require further individualized discovery, hearings, and 
determinations as to liability and other affirmative defenses that cannot be easily 
dealt with by dividing a class into subclasses. In fact, some courts have severed Rule 
20 joinder cases on similar grounds, noting that it would be impossible to manage 
the discovery of so many different defendants, all of whom would need individual 
depositions and many of whom would raise different or incompatible defenses.167
 By putting so many individualized issues together in a single case, any efficiency 
gains that might otherwise accrue through the use of a class action are lost—in fact, 
procedural complexity is added by requiring the plaintiffs to undergo the certification 
process. As a result, a class action proceeding is not “superior” to other methods of 
adjudicating these claims. Additionally, because swarm litigation cases require a 
large number of individual factual adjudications, the discovery and hearings 
associated with these individualized concerns would slow the proceedings 
dramatically for everyone involved.168 This makes the entire process significantly 
longer for everyone involved than individually adjudicating cases in parallel.
 Rule 23 also instructs courts to consider “the likely difficulties in managing a class 
action” in making the superiority determination.169 In doing so, courts examine their 
interests in trial management and judicial efficiency. While a typical joinder case can 
be time-consuming due to the number of defendants involved, the class action process 
is even more procedurally complex, with multiple requirements for certification and 
the possibility for related interlocutory appeals. The court is responsible for finding, 
appointing, and ensuring funding for appropriate class counsel, and approving class 
representatives; it is generally far more involved in the class action process than it would 
be in a joinder case.170 Further, the sheer size of a defendant class increases the potential 
time spent dealing with discovery-related issues and adjudicating the individualized 
issues that arise out of the putative swarm infringement class action. These factors 
make swarm infringement class actions difficult to manage and inefficient, which 
weighs in favor of denying defendant class certification in these cases.
   c. Rule 23 Opt-Out Provisions
 Defendant class actions certified under Rule 23 allow class members to opt out 
of the litigation once the class has been certified, forcing the plaintiffs to pursue 
167. See, e.g., Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165, 169–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also SBO 
Pictures v. Does 1–20, No. 12. Civ. 3925 (SAS), 2012 WL 2304253, at *1 (2d Cir. June 18, 2012) 
(holding that “there [were] no litigation economies to be gained” from joining together what essentially 
amounted to twenty different cases).
168. Discovery and any individualized pretrial hearings must be completed before the case can move forward, 
forcing the entire case to proceed in series. As a result, each defendant must wait for every other 
defendant’s pretrial proceedings to be completed before moving to trial, which slows down the 
proceedings dramatically.
169. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D).
170. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
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them individually. Under Rule 23(b)(3), opt-outs are allowed because participation in 
such actions for monetary relief is not mandatory.171 This gives class members 
freedom to decide whether they would benefit from pooling resources to create an 
effective offense or defense.172 In practice, however, in a defendant class action “no 
one wants to be a defendant, so . . . defendant class members who have an opportunity 
to opt-out can be expected to do so.”173
 The ability for class members to opt out could completely eviscerate a defendant 
class action.174 Indeed, this may counsel against bringing a swarm infringement 
defendant class action at all. In such a case, after surviving the interminable 
certification process, defendant class members could opt out en masse, destroying 
any efficiency and consistency benefits that would otherwise be gained.175 Thus, the 
Rule 23 opt-out provision in and of itself presents a reason why a defendant class 
action might not be a “superior” way to adjudicate these claims under Rule 23.
 A swarm infringement defendant class is effectively uncertifiable, as plaintiffs’ 
attorneys face significant hurdles satisfying most of Rule 23’s requirements. Further, 
even if a defendant class is certified, there is a risk that defendants will opt out of the 
class wholesale, defeating the purpose of the certification process while squandering 
precious judicial resources. Thus, the defendant class action is not a proper vehicle 
for adjudicating swarm litigation.
V. pOLiCY issUEs raisEd bY sWarM LitigatiOn
 While swarm litigation’s settlement-centered strategy may not be inherently 
problematic, courts and commentators alike have expressed concerns about the coercive 
and unfair nature of such tactics.176 Swarm infringement litigation has been subject to 
significant criticism on policy and fairness grounds. Many of these same critiques apply 
to defendant class actions under Rule 23 as well. This Part analyzes the most serious 
171. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810–11 (1985).
172. E.g., Netto, supra note 114, at 98.
173. Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (citing Angelo N. Ancheta, 
Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 283, 306–07 (1985)).
174. Robert R. Simpson & Craig Lyle Perra, Defendant Class Actions, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1319, 1334 (2000). 
For this reason, some commentators discuss reasons for the removal of the Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out 
provisions in defendant class actions. However, this would require amending Rule 23, and as such is 
beyond the scope of this note. See Robert E. Holo, Defendant Class Actions: The Failure of Rule 23 and a 
Proposed Solution, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 223, 266 (1990).
175. One commentator recommends an “aggressive litigation strategy” against defendants who opt out as a 
solution to this problem. Noh, supra note 131, at 138. However, we have already seen from the example 
that the RIAA has set that such a strategy is incredibly costly and contrary to the plaintiffs’ goals of 
running a profitable and sustainable litigation campaign. See supra Part III.B.ii.
176. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–10, No. 2:12-cv-3623-ODW(PJW), 2012 WL 5382304, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (describing swarm infringement litigation as an “extortion scheme”); Digital Sins, 
Inc. v. Does 1–245, No. 11 Civ. 8170(CM), 2012 WL 1744838, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012) (“I am 
second to none in my dismay at the theft of copyrighted material that occurs every day on the internet [sic]. 
However, there is a right way and a wrong way to litigate, and so far this way strikes me as the wrong way.”).
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criticisms leveled against swarm infringement litigation under Rule 20 and explains 
how these issues are implicated in a defendant class action proceeding under Rule 23.
 A. The High Rate of Defendant Misidentification
 The use of BitTorrent monitoring software to gather IP addresses presents a 
significant risk of defendant misidentification.177 As one judge noted, “It is no more 
likely that the subscriber to an IP address carried out a particular computer function 
. . . than to say an individual who pays the telephone bill made a specific telephone 
call.”178 “By defining Doe Defendants as ISP subscribers who were assigned certain 
IP addresses, instead of the actual Internet users who allegedly engaged in infringing 
activity, [plaintiffs] . . . ha[ve] the potential to draw numerous innocent Internet 
users into the litigation.”179 This inaccuracy produces the unfair results often 
associated with swarm infringement cases, especially because the litigation strategy 
incentivizes extracting settlements even from innocent individuals. Further, while 
defendant misidentification is problematic in Rule 20 joinder cases, this risk is even 
greater in a Rule 23 defendant class action. A defendant class can include a much 
larger group than even the largest Rule 20 joinder cases, which only increases the 
likelihood that innocent individuals will be caught in plaintiffs’ dragnets.180
 B.  Defending a Charge of Infringement Is Cost Prohibitive and Risks Public 
Humiliation
 Swarm infringement suits carry a particularly high risk of convincing innocent 
defendants to settle because the settlement amounts are far cheaper than actually 
177. In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); see also 
Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that plaintiff ’s counsel 
estimated “that 30% of the names turned over by ISPs are not those of individuals who actually 
downloaded or shared copyrighted material”); Chothia et al., supra note 27, at 3, 11 (arguing that 
monitoring software fails to provide “conclusive evidence of copyright infringement”); Nate Anderson, 
Hurt by The Hurt Locker: Why IP Addresses Aren’t Enough to Find File-Swappers, ArsTechnica (Aug. 
26, 2011, 1:37 PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/08/why-ip-addresses-cant-always-
find-file-swappers/. But see Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1, 6, 13, 14, 950 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782 (E.D. 
Pa. 2013) (finding that the combination of IP address location methods alongside other investigative 
steps used to identify defendants required “considerable effort and expense . . . and that the technology 
employed by [the plaintiff ’s] consultants . . . was valid”).
178. In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. at 84.
179. SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1–3036, No. 11–4220 SC, 2011 WL 6002620, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 
2011). Some judges have found that this lack of certainty fails the specificity requirement for discovery 
requests, finding that it is not “sufficiently specific to establish a reasonable likelihood that the discovery 
request would lead to identifying information that would make possible service upon particular 
defendants who could be sued in federal court.” In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 
296 F.R.D. at 88 (quoting Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004)). But see Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Smith, 274 F.R.D. 334 (D.D.C. 2011); Call of the Wild 
Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.D.C. 2011).
180. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (providing that a class action is only warranted when “the class is so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable”).
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defending a claim, and because “[w]ithout a substantial investment, plaintiffs can 
inf late each defendant’s litigation costs, thereby transforming an otherwise viable 
defense into one with a negative expected value.”181 Indeed, one court has held that 
a plaintiff ’s desire to enforce its copyright in what it asserts is a cost-effective 
manner does not justify perverting the joinder rules to first create . . . management 
and logistical problems . . . and then offer to settle with Doe defendants so that 
they can avoid digging themselves out of the morass plaintiff is creating.182
Attempting to certify a defendant class action with all its inherent complexity creates 
a more expensive and time-consuming procedural morass than even the largest of 
joinder suits. Settlement becomes the only cost-effective option for avoiding potential 
liability, no matter how strong the evidence of a defendant’s innocence.
 Plaintiffs can also wield significant leverage against defendants in swarm 
infringement suits, leading one judge to describe such cases as “an extortion 
scheme.”183 The fact that these swarm infringement suits generally involve adult 
entertainment heightens these concerns, as plaintiffs often play on fears of public 
humiliation to leverage settlements.184 The threat of enormous statutory damages 
under the Copyright Act is similarly intimidating, as a finding of liability for willful 
infringement can result in damages of up to $150,000 per infringement.185 As a 
result, when faced with the choice between a few thousand dollars in settlement 
costs or an expensive, protracted, embarrassing, and potentially ruinous lawsuit, 
many otherwise innocent defendants choose to settle.186
 C. Burden on the Courts
 Courts have been particularly worried about the impact swarm litigation cases 
have on judicial resources.187 In any civil action in federal court, plaintiffs must pay a 
181. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 137, at 698.
182. On The Cheap, LLC v. Does 1–5011, 280 F.R.D. 500, 505 (N.D. Cal. 2011); accord In re BitTorrent 
Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. at 80. But see, e.g., AF Holdings LLC v. Does 
1–1058, 286 F.R.D. 39 (D.D.C. 2012); W. Coast Prods. v. Does 1–5829, 275 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2011).
183. Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–10, No. 2:12-cv-3623-ODW(PJWx), 2012 WL 5382304, at *4 (C.D. 
Cal. June 27, 2012); see also, e.g., Digital Sins, Inc. v. Does 1–245, No. 11 Civ. 8170(CM), 2012 WL 
1744838, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012); In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 
F.R.D. at 80. 
184. Malibu Media LLC v. John Doe Subscriber Assigned IP Address 24.183.51.58, No. 13-cv-205-wmc, 
2013 WL 4821911, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 10, 2013); see, e.g., Michaels, supra note 76; Bill Torpy, 
BitTorrent’s Popularity Leads to Mass Litigation, Ariz. Daily Sun (July 15, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://bit.
ly/NxmK8q (quoting Robin Mason, a defendant named in a suit by an adult film company, as stating 
“They said it’ll be in the newspaper. They said the whole community would know.”).
185. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
186. This strategy does have the potential to backfire. See Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc., No. 12-CV-469-
YGR, 2012 WL 1252710, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2012).
187. See, e.g., Pac. Century Int’l v. Does 1–37, 282 F.R.D. 189, 195 (N.D. Ill. 2012); In re BitTorrent Adult 
Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. at 91; IO Grp., Inc. v. Does 1–435, No. C 10–04382 SI, 
2011 WL 445043, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011).
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filing fee of $350, which acts as a modest “threshold barrier . . . against the filing of 
frivolous or otherwise meritless lawsuits”188 and generates revenue that maintains the 
court system.189
 These swarm infringement cases exist “as a strong tool for leveraging settlements 
. . . whose efficiency is largely derived from the plaintiffs’ success in avoiding the 
filing fees for multiple suits . . . .”190 By pursuing the maximum number of defendants 
in court under one filing, swarm infringement plaintiffs improperly avoid paying 
filing fees, which deprives the courts of millions of dollars of revenue.191 This is 
particularly worrisome in a defendant class action because the procedural complexity 
of class certification consumes significant judicial resources.192
Vi. COnCLUsiOn
 The use of defendant class actions for prosecuting BitTorrent infringers individually 
through swarm infringement suits raises significant due process and fairness concerns. 
Swarm infringement defendant classes are almost certainly uncertifiable under Rule 
23. Even if such a class were to be certified, there is a significant danger that defendants 
will opt out of the class en masse, rendering the judicial resources spent on the 
certification process unnecessary.
 Moreover, the swarm infringement litigation strategy creates a substantial risk of 
coercing innocent individuals into paying settlement fees for infringements that they 
did not commit. This is simply antithetical to a legal system founded on due process. 
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2012); In re Diet Drugs v. Wyeth, 325 F. Supp. 2d 540, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1931(a) (2012) (“Of the amounts paid to the clerk of court as a fee . . . $190 shall be 
deposited into a special fund of the Treasury to be available to offset funds appropriated for the operation 
and maintenance of the courts of the United States.”).
190. MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1–149, No. C 11–02331 LB, 2011 WL 4352110, at *4 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 
2011); see also In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. at 92; Pac. Century 
Int’ l, 282 F.R.D. at 193; Allan Gregory, The Economics of (Killing) Mass-BitTorrent Lawsuits, 
TorrentFreak (Sept. 18, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/the-economics-of-killing-mass-bittorrent-
lawsuits-110918/. 
191. Certainly, the argument can be made that plaintiffs here are simply taking advantage of Rule 23’s design 
goals of efficiency and economics in litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. However, both Rule 20’s permissive 
joinder and Rule 23’s class action rules grant judges significant leeway to consider policy and trial 
management issues when determining whether to proceed via joinder or class actions. Rule 21 allows 
courts to “sever any claim against a party,” and Rule 23(b)(3)(C) and (D) allow courts to consider issues 
of trial management when certifying classes under Rule 23(b)(3). In swarm infringement cases, as 
several judges have noted, “the potential for coercing unjust settlements from innocent defendants 
trumps [the plaintiff ’s] interest in maintaining low litigation costs.” K-Beech v. Does 1–41, No. V–11–
46, 2012 WL 773683, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2012); see also In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright 
Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. at 80. But see AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–1058, 286 F.R.D. 39, 45 
(D.D.C. 2012); Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–5, 285 F.R.D. 273, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Patrick 
Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–21, 282 F.R.D. 161 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (finding swarm joinder to be permissible).
192. See, e.g., Media Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–26, No. 12 Civ. 3719(HB), 2012 WL 3866492, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 4, 2012) (noting that “[i]t is difficult to even imagine the extraordinary amount of time federal 
judges have spent on these cases” and listing a “sample” of thirty swarm infringement cases across 
multiple districts).
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These cases also burden the court system, depriving it of necessary revenue while at 
the same time contributing dramatically to its workload. Certifying defendant class 
actions in this context would only exacerbate these policy concerns. For these reasons, 
courts should refuse to certify classes of swarm defendants.
